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A MEMORANDUM ON APPELLATE PRACTICE
A MEMORANDUM ON APPELLATE PRACTICE*
JAMES MORRIS"
UDICIAL power is inherent in the people, who being unable
to exercise that power directly, have by the Constitution of
the State of North Dakota vested it in the courts. Thus judicial
power resides exclusively in the courts and may not be conferred
upon ministerial officers, boards or commissions. The courts named
in the Constitution are the Supreme Court, the district court, the
county court, justice of the peace, and such other courts as the
legislature may create for cities, incorporated towns, and villages.
This discussion will deal only with the Supreme Court, and in a
general way with the procedure by which its appellate jurisdiction
may be invoked. When we use the word "jurisdiction" we mean
the authority of the court to hear and determine a legal contro-
versy. It is only where such a controversy exists that the court may
render a judicial decision. The Constitution vests in the Supreme
Court three broad powers-appellate jurisdiction, general super-
intending control over inferior courts under regulations and lim-
itations prescribed by the legislature, and original jurisdiction to
issue original and remedial writs. The legislature may not impose
duties upon the Supreme Court or any of the judges thereof except
such as are judicial. This is in accordance with the fundamental
principle of free government requiring the separation of branches
of government into the .executive, legislative and judicial. We have
in this state, however, infringed on that principle by section
76 of the North Dakota Constitution making the Chief Justice a
member ,f the Board of Pardon and by article 54 of the Amend-
ments which places the Chief Justice in a group of three persons
whose duty is to choose by unanimous selection a list of three names
from which the governor makes a nomination for membership on
the State Board of Higher Education.
The Supreme Court is required by the Constitution to write an
opinion setting forth the reasons for the decision in each case where
a judgment or decree is reversed or confirmed. It is also made the
duty of the Court to prepare a syllabus of points adjudicated. In
many states the court is not required to prepare a syllabus, this
being done by clerks or by law book publishers. That is why after
the syllabus in each North Dakota case there appears the nota-
0 Address delivered at the annual dinner of the North Dakota Chapter of the Order
of the Coif, April 24, 1953.
0* Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Dakota.
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tion, "Syllabus by the Court." This syllabus is perhaps the most
important expression of our work for it is the ultimate declaration
of the law of the case, carefully prepared and agreed to by all of
the members signing the opinion.
The Supreme Court does not and cannot be required to give
advisory opinions, that is, opinions which are not necessary to the
determination of a controversy before the Court. It is not the duty
of the Supreme Court to advise the officials of the other branches
of government as to what the law is. The giving of such advice is
the function of another constitutional officer, the Attorney General
of the state.
The Supreme Court consists of five judges, a majority of whom
are necessary to form a quorum or pronounce a decision. In one
instance, however, the majority does not necessarily prevail. A
legislative enactment may not be declared unconstitutional unless
at least four of the judges so decide. We have had instances where
the opinion of three judges, constituting a majority of the Court,
did not prevail.'
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is most fre-
quently invoked. While the power of the Court derives from the
Constitution, the right of appeal, the procedure for exercising it,
and the scope of review are statutory. In determining whether a
right of appeal exists, the courts construe appeal statutes liberally
in furtherance of the right of appeal, but the right sought to be
asserted must be such that it can be spelled out of the statute or
it does not exist. Contrary to the rule with respect to general juris-
diction, appellate jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of
the parties.2
At this point it might be worth our while to consider briefly a
few main points in the procedure by Which a civil case may be
brought to the Supreme Court for review.
An appeal implies a review of some or all of the acts of the
trial court for the purpose of correcting errors that have occurred
in the court below. Thus there appears the rule we have often
stated that an issue which is neither raised nor considered in the
trial court cannot be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court.
3
1. See State ex rel. Sathre v. Board of University and School Lands, 65 N.D. 687,
262 N.W. 60 (1935); Wilson v. Fargo, 48 N.D. 447, 186 N.W. 263 (1921); Daly v.
Beery, 45 N.D. 287, 178 N.W. 104 (1920).
2. Bryan v. Miller, 73 "N.D. 487, 16 N.W.2d 275 (1944); Muhlhauser v. Becker,
74 N:D. 35, 20 N.W.2d 353 (1945).
3. McDonald v. Abraham, 75 N.D. 457, 28 N.W.2d 582 (1947).
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The responsibility of trial-lawyers in this respect has been pointedly
stated by the Supreme Court of Arizona:
"It is their business to be attentive on a trial, and, if they miss a
point by neglect, they must lose it. Neither can we allow them
to strike between wind and water on the trial, and then go
home to their books and study out other objections and urge
them here. They must stand or fall upon the case they made
below, for this court is not a forum to discuss new points of
this character, but simply a court of review to determine
whether the rulings of the court on the case as presented were
correct or not." 4
The scope of the review in the Supreme Court is governed by
two things-first, the questions and issues which have been before
the trial court; and, second, the procedure pursued by the appel-
lant in taking and perfecting the appeal. We will now devote some
time to the second point, for the failure of counsel to follow the
proper appellate procedure frequently makes it difficult, and some-
times makes it impossible, for the Supreme Court to conduct a
comprehensive review of the issues which the appellant wishes
to present.
Just as all issues must first be presented in the trial court, so too
the manner of their presentation in that court determines which of
two avenues of procedure must be followed, should a disappointed
party undertake an appeal. Civil trials generally fall into two cate-
gories. They are trials to the court without a jury, where the court
determines both the law and the facts, and trials to a court and
jury, where the court determines the law and the jury is trier of
the facts. The initial, fundamental, and jurisdictional step in every
appeal is the service of a notice of appeal in writing, signed by
the appellant or his attorney, on the adverse party and the filing
of this notice in the office of the clerk of court in which the judg-
ment or order appealed from is entered.5 This notice must be
served and filed within six months after the entry of a judgment,
if the appeal is from a judgment; and if the appeal is from an order,
the notice must be served and filed within sixty days after written
notice of the order is given to the party appealing.6 These time
limits are strictly statutory and may not be extended by the order
of any court or by stipulation or agreement of the parties. Most
judgments are appealable but only such orders may be appealed
from as the statute prescribes.
7
4. Rush v. French, 1 Ariz. 99, 25 Pac. 816, 823 (1874).
5. N.D. Rev. Code §28-2705 (1943).
6. N.D. Rev. Code §28-2704 (1943).
7. N.D. Rev. Code §28-2702 (1943).
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In all appeals, whether the case was tried before the court or
before a jury, or whether the appeal is from an order or from a
judgment, there must be brought to the Supreme Court the record
upon which the trial court made the challeiiged decision. This rec-
ord, enumerating and containing the matters considered by the
court in rendering the decision from which the appeal is taken, is
known as the statement of the case.8
The only time that a statement of the case is not a requisite of
appeal from a judgment is when the error upon which review is
sought appears upon the face of the record.9 Our statutes do not
specifically require a settlement of the statement of the case upon
an appeal from an order, but the record upon which the order is
based must be certified to by the trial court or described and iden-
tified in the order from which the appeal is taken.1o
Let us now go to a consideration of the appeals in the two
types of cases which we have designated as cases triable by the
court and cases triable to the court and jury. It is not enough to
serve and file a notice of appeal and to have the trial judge certify
the records to the Supreme Court. The appellant has other and
very important duties to perform. A statutory undertaking must
be furnished in most cases. The appellant must point out to the
Supreme Court just what he wants the Court to review. In cases
tried to the court without a jury the appellant from a judgment
must secure a settled statement of the case. If he desires a complete
review of all questions of law and fact, he needs comply with but
one simple requirement, which is to include in the statement of
the case a demand for the review of the entire case. The Supreme
Court will then retry the case as to the issues of fact and law which
appear on the certified record. If the appellant does not wish the
Supreme Court to retry on the record all the issues of fact, the
appellant, instead of demanding a trial anew, "shall specify therein
the question of fact that he desires the Supreme Court to review,
and all questions of fact not so specified shall be deemed on appeal
to have been properly decided by the trial court." 11 It is important
to realize the scope and simplicity of the demand for trial anew
of a case that has been tried to the court without a jury. Some-
times the appellant does not realize how easy it is and attempts
instead to specify errors as though the case had been tried to a jury.
8. It is described in Chapter 28-18, North Dakota Revised Code of 1943.
9. N.D. Rev. Code §22-2728 (1943).
10. Thorp v. Thorp, 46 N.D. 113, 180 N.W. 26 (1920).
11. N.D. Rev. Code 128-2732 (1943).
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It is important, too, to remember that the demand for trial anew
must be filed and settled as a part of the statement of the case.
To incorporate it in or attach it to the notice of appeal, which has
frequently happened, is not enough. The method of appeal I have
just outlined to you is of growing importance for in civil litigation
the trend is toward a determination by a trial court of both law
-and facts without a jury, and along with that trend has come an
increasing number of cases brought to the Supreme Court for trial
-anew.
We now turn to appeals for judgment rendered in cases tried
to the court and jury. There a demand for a trial anew avails the
.appellant nothing. Again, he must settle a statement of the case
unless the alleged error appears on the face of the judgment roll.
At the very inception of an appeal from a judgment rendered in a
-case tried to a jury, the appellant must serve with the notice of
-appeal a concise statement of the errors of law, if any, of which
he complains; and, if he claims that the evidence is insufficient to
support the verdict of the jury or is of such a character that the
verdict should be set aside as a matter of the court's discretion,
he must so specify.1 2 As an aid to clear presentation, specifications
of error should be separately numbered and, usually, but one point
-or ruling should appear in a specification which should include
reference to the exhibit, document, or line and page of the transcript
-where the alleged error appears.
If the appellant challenges the correctness of the verdict on the
ground of insufficiency of the evidence, he must point out specifi-
cally wherein the evidence is insufficient. A general statement that
the evidence is insufficient to warrant the verdict means nothing
without further specifications. But here again we operate under the
shadow of the rule already mentioned that the question or issue
reviewed must have first been brought to the attention of the trial
-court. No matter how meticulously specifications of the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence may be drawn, they will present nothing
for review unless the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
verdict was first questioned in the trial court, either by a motion
for a directed verdict or by a motion for a new trial, or both, and
the ruling or rulings of the trial court assigned as error on the
appeal.1 3 Thus, if an appellant is to challenge the sufficiency of
12. N.D. Rev. Code §28-1809 (1943); In re Heiden's Estate, 57 N.W.2d 242
<N.D. 1953).
13. Westerso v. City of Williston, 77 N.D. 251, 42 N.W.2d 429 (1950).
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the evidence on appeal, he must lay his foundation therefor in
the trial court.
An appeal is not the only remedy afforded a disappointed litigant
from an adverse verdict. He may seek a new trial, which is a re-
examination of the issues in the same court. If the trial court
makes an order denying the motion for a new trial, an appeal may
be taken from that order to the Supreme Court and, frequently,
an appeal from the judgment and an appeal from an order denying
a new trial are prosecuted concurrently and argued together in
the Supreme Court. The right to and the procedure for seeking a
new trial are statutory and the statutes prescribing them must be
substantially followed. Any attempt at a detailed discussion of the
procedure involved in seeking a new trial would trespass upon
time that I do not feel free to take, so I leave you to study the
statutes and decisions construing them.
The rules of appellate procedure are not unduly technical or in-
volved. They are designed to permit the litigant who believes that
the court has erred against him to have his case reviewed and er-
rors, if any, corrected. The observations which I have made are
not intended to cover all of the rules or situations which might
arise under the rules that have been discussed. It has been my
purpose to present a few basic principles and thereby to challenge
your interest in the procedure by which a case may be presented
to the Supreme Court.
I would recommend that before you try a case which you may
find necessary to appeal you study the statutes and decisions per-
taining to appellate practice so that in the trial court you may lay
a proper foundation for an appeal in event error contributes to an
adverse decision, and that if you do appeal you may take the
proper steps within the time prescribed by law which will bring
to the Supreme Court a record from which may be determined
the questions which you desire to present. You will find further
help from the rules of practice that have been promulgated by the
Supreme Court. An attorney contemplating an appeal should fami-
liarize himself with these rules. They may be found at the begin-
ning of Volume 76 of the North Dakota Reports.
As a final word of advice, may I suggest that appellant's counsel
prepare appeal papers with care and timely do that which he
intends to do. He will thereby not only advantage his client, but
will save himself inconvenience and embarrassment. The Supreme
Court prefers to decide cases upon the merits presented by records
that are free from unnecessary and vexatious questions of practice.
